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ABSTRACT

EXPERIMENTAL MODIFICATION OF DYSFUNCTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS IN
INDIVIDUALS WITH CONTAMINATION CONCERNS

Sara Louise Conley, M.A.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Kevin D. Wu, Ph.D., Director

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a debilitating disorder characterized by
obsessions and compulsions that cause noticeable impairment across multiple life domains
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Various models have been used to describe
the etiology and maintenance of this disorder, however, the cognitive-behavioral approach to
OCD is the model with the most empirical support and direct treatment implications
(Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009). Additionally, this approach provides parsimonious
descriptions of obsessions, compulsions, and their interrelations (Taylor, Abramowitz, &
McKay, 2007). Extensive research regarding the etiology and maintenance of the disorder
supports the theory that obsessions and compulsions arise from dysfunctional interpretations of
intrusive thoughts. Experimental methods that attempt to modify interpretations, which may in
turn reduce obsessions, represent an important next step in research.
To date, research on interpretation biases following presentation of ambiguous stimuli
has been completed in the context of several disorders highlighted by the experience of anxiety,
however, only four studies examine the interpretation of ambiguous scenarios in the context of

OCD. Moreover, none has examined the effect of interpretation modification on performance
during a contamination-related behavioral avoidance test (BAT). The current study utilized a
computerized interpretation assessment (the Word Sentence Association Paradigm, WSAP) and
modification paradigm (Interpretation Modification Paradigm, IMP) to extend extant literature
by measuring and modifying dysfunctional interpretations and examining the effect of
modification on levels of bias and behavioral avoidance in individuals with contamination
concerns.
Participants (N = 74) completed a battery of questionnaires followed by a pre-assessment
of interpretation bias (i.e., level of dysfunctional interpretation) and were then randomized into
the active or control condition. Participants then completed the appropriate interpretation
training, followed by a post-assessment of interpretation bias and three, six step BATs,
measuring their anxiety and disgust at each step. Results indicated that changes in interpretation
bias for threat cues were different across conditions (F(1, 147) = 21.52, p < .001), with the active
condition (t(41) = 8.36, p < .001), but not the control condition (t(31) = 1.56, p = .13) showing a
significant decrease in bias from pre-to-post assessment. Conversely, interpretation biases for
benign cues did not change significantly from pre-to-post assessment in either condition (F(1, 147)
= .01, p = .94). Analyses of the BATs indicated that participants performed similarly on the
BATs regardless of condition, however, as a whole, participants completed significantly more
steps on BAT1 76.4% than they did on BAT 2 (64.7%; t(59) = 2.41, p = .019) or BAT3 (65.6%;
t(73) = 3.27, p = .002). Furthermore, participants in both groups reported similar levels of anxiety
and disgust for each of the three BATs when ratings were collapsed across steps.
Taken together, these results suggest that completion of the active modification condition
(IMP) was beneficial in reducing dysfunctional interpretations in individuals with contamination

3

concerns; however, it did not appear to have immediate behavioral or emotional consequences.
Limitations notwithstanding, the present study extends the extant literature and provides a
foundation for future studies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

The essential features of OCD are obsessions and compulsions. Obsessions are
characterized by: (1) Recurrent and persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced
as intrusive and cause anxiety or distress; (2) concerns above and beyond worries about real-life
issues; (3) attempts to neutralize, suppress, attenuate, or ignore the obsessions with another
thought or action; and (4) a realization by an individual that obsessions are a product of his/her
own mind (Abramowitz et al., 2009). Compulsions are repetitive behaviors or mental acts
individuals feel compelled to complete according to a rigid pattern. The aim of compulsions is
to attenuate distress, neutralize anxiety, and in some instances, prevent perceived negative events
(e.g., illness, death of a loved one) from occurring as a result of the obsessions. Compulsions are
not done for pleasure, and are often unrealistically related to the obsessional content or feared
outcome (APA, 2013). That is, compulsions are not necessarily connected in a realistic way with
what they aim to neutralize or prevent. For example, individuals may obsess about a loved one
being harmed, and respond to the anxiety by arranging or ordering unrelated items in a specific
way.
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Prevalence, demographic features, and impairment. OCD is the 10th leading cause of
disability and the 4th most common psychiatric disorder in the United States (Fisher & Wells,
2008), with a 12-month prevalence of 1.2% (APA, 2013) and a lifetime prevalence of 1.6%
(Kessler, Berglund, Delmer, Jin, & Walters, 2005). OCD has a slightly higher prevalence rate in
females compared to males, but displays an earlier onset in males (APA, 2013). Symptom onset
is typically gradual; however, cases with acute onset have been reported (APA, 2013). The
disorder typically begins to develop in late adolescence or early adulthood, but childhood cases
have also been documented.
A majority of individuals diagnosed with OCD maintain an episodic course characterized
by waxing and waning symptoms, and if left untreated, OCD can become a chronic disorder.
Chronic OCD has been linked to decreased social functioning and quality of life (Tenney, Denys,
van Megen, Glas, & Westenberg, 2003), with noticeable impairment across multiple life
domains. Specifically, compared to individuals suffering from other unipolar disorders (e.g.,
depression), individuals diagnosed with OCD are less likely to be married, more likely to be
unemployed, and report higher levels of impairment in regard to social and occupational
functioning (Torres et al., 2006). Impairment can be a direct effect of excessive time being spent
on obsessions and compulsions, or an indirect effect of obsessional content or symptom
presentation. For example, individuals who have obsessional content about becoming
contaminated or ill as a result of contact with germs may avoid public places or refuse to
entertain friends and family in their home, preventing the development of intimate relationships.

Heterogeneity of OCD. OCD is a heterogeneous disorder with varying symptom
presentations and numerous possibilities for obsessional content and compulsive behaviors.
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Symptom patterns are extremely variable, allowing two individuals to receive a diagnosis of
OCD based on distinct symptom presentations. Nevertheless, research (Abramowitz et al., 2009;
McKay et al., 2004) indicates that symptoms typically converge to create five main dimensions:
(1) Obsessions about being responsible for or failing to prevent harm, paired with checking
compulsions and reassurance seeking; (2) symmetry obsessions paired with ordering and
counting rituals; (3) contamination obsessions, paired with washing and cleaning rituals; (4)
repugnant obsessions concerning sex, violence, or religion, often paired with thinking a “good”
thought to replace the “bad” thought; and (5) hoarding obsessions paired with collecting
compulsions.1
The symptomatic heterogeneity of OCD can make research in this field challenging.
Because of this, the current project focused solely on a single symptom dimension:
contamination. Contamination obsessions often are related to general uncleanliness, dirt, germs,
or disease; compulsions typically are related to washing or cleaning rituals (Rachman, 2004;
2006). This dimension of OCD was selected for logistical reasons. Namely, contaminationrelated OCD is one of the most common clinical presentations of OCD (Rasmussen & Eisen,
1992) and is likely to be endorsed fairly commonly at sub-clinical levels by non-clinical samples.
Additionally, in terms of translating findings in the extant research to OCD, the contamination
dimension allows for greater generalizability across participants because obsessions generally are
similar (e.g., stimuli would be applicable to a wider range of participants because of relatively
limited intra-dimensional heterogeneity) and existing contamination-based behavioral approach
tasks used in OCD research have garnered the most empirical support in terms of sound
psychometric properties (e.g., Najmi, Tobin, & Amir, 2012).
1

Recent research supports the removal of hoarding as an OCD subtype, instead classifying it as a separate disorder.
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Contemporary Models of OCD

Various contemporary models have focused on the beliefs and strategies involved in the
etiology, maintenance, and exacerbation of OCD (Doron & Kyrios, 2005). Models include, but
are not limited to: the pediatric streptococcal model (PSM; Taylor et al., 2006), the “noncognitive/emotion” based security motivation model (SMM; Szechtman & Woody, 2004; Taylor
et al., 2006), neurodevelopmental models (e.g., Rosenberg & Keshavan, 1998), and a cognitivebehavioral model (Freestone, Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 1996; Frost & Steketee, 2002; Salkovskis,
1985, 1989, 1996). For several reasons, the current project focused on the contemporary
cognitive-behavioral model of OCD. First, the model emphasizes the role of faulty appraisals as
a critical cognitive component in the etiology and maintenance of the disorder (Clark, 2004),
which directly aligns with the goals of this project. Second, the model fits all requisites of a
“good model of OCD” as defined by Taylor et al. (2007). That is, the model provides a
parsimonious description of obsessions and compulsions, their interrelations, the etiology and
clinical course of the disorder, and the heterogeneity of symptoms. Third, specific treatment
implications can be derived from the model (e.g., providing information about why some
treatments are effective whereas others are not, and informing future treatments). Fourth, the
cognitive-behavioral approach is the contemporary psychological model with the most empirical
support (Abramowitz et al., 2009).
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The Cognitive-Behavioral Model of OCD

The cognitive-behavioral approach to OCD posits that obsessions and compulsions arise
from certain dysfunctional beliefs and are contingent upon the strength or level of importance
allotted to those beliefs (Abramowitz et al., 2009). This model is based on the findings that
unwanted intrusive thoughts, images, or impulses are experienced by most individuals in the
general population (Gibbs, 1996), often are reflective of important issues in one’s life (Rachman,
1997), and are triggered by internal or external cues (Rachman, 1997). However, the intrusions
do not develop into obsessions unless the individual attributes exaggerated significance to the
intrusion or appraises it as highly important, threatening, distressing, or immoral. If the
individual’s appraisal of the thought encompasses dysfunctional beliefs, the appraisal will evoke
distress, therefore motivating the individual to engage in behaviors that attenuate the distress.
For example, an individual could experience an intrusive thought about becoming ill as a result
of shaking hands with a stranger. If the thought was regarded as unpleasant but meaningless, it
may be ignored, allowing for adaptive interpersonal interaction. On the other hand, if the same
thought was regarded as distressing or threatening, it may develop into an obsession. This, in
turn, may lead the individual to feel the need to attenuate the distress by avoiding contact with
strangers and/or engaging in compulsions (e.g., hand washing) to alleviate distress.
From the cognitive-behavioral perspective, compulsions develop in an effort to remove
intrusions and prevent perceived potential consequences. Specifically, compulsions are
negatively reinforcing, and therefore become persistent and excessive because they provide the
individual with a desired outcome: immediate distress alleviation and temporary removal of the
intrusion (Abramowitz et al., 2009; Rachman, 1997). Compulsions are paradoxical in nature;
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their function is to alleviate the distress associated with obsessions; however, they also serve as
reminders or triggers for intrusive thoughts, and thereby increase the frequency and intensity of
both obsessions and compulsions (Abramowitz et al., 2009; Frost & Steketee, 2002; Rachman,
2002; Taylor et al., 2007). For example, if a man experienced obsessions about contamination
and engaged in subsequent washing rituals to alleviate the distress, he may cause skin lesions on
his hands. These lesions may actually increase the probability of contamination and trigger
further intrusions, reactivating the obsessional thoughts and increasing compulsive washing.

Measurement of Dysfunctional Beliefs

Although the cognitive-behavioral theory is compelling conceptually and supported by a
great deal of empirical evidence, problems have arisen in translating the theory to clinical
practice. The main impediment is a lack of consensus among researchers regarding two issues:
(1) how to define cognitive constructs and (2) which cognitive constructs should be viewed as
essential features of OCD. Substantial research conducted by an international group of OCD
researchers, known as the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG),
utilized information gathered from several self-report measures of obsessive beliefs to develop a
new, concise measure. The primary aim of the OCCWG was to create operational definitions of
OC beliefs. Moreover, the group aimed to develop a standard measure that could be used to
analyze the cognitive components of OCD.
In 1997, the OCCWG identified and operationalized six core belief domains believed to
be etiological agents and maintaining factors in OCD. The beliefs include: (1) inflated
responsibility, (2) over-importance of thoughts, (3) excessive concern about the importance of
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controlling one’s thoughts, (4) overestimation of threat, (5) intolerance of uncertainty, and (6)
perfectionism. To streamline research and standardize definitions and measurement, the
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG 1997, 2003) was developed.
Initial data collection on the OBQ allowed for concurrent and discriminant validity to be
established, and for unreliable items to be removed. Item removal resulted in an 87-item OBQ
(originally 127 items). Additional data collection and factor analysis returned three empirically
supported domains of dysfunctional beliefs central to OCD (OCCWG 2005):
(1) Overestimation of Threat and Inflated Responsibility. Individuals who suffer from OCD may
experience appraisals that include exaggerated estimates of the probability of aversive events
occurring, and the cost incurred. It has been suggested that individuals who suffer from
OCD have problems with epistemological reasoning, meaning they view situations as
threatening or aversive until proven safe. Conversely, the general population has a reverse
view, in that they tend to view situations as safe until proven otherwise. Additionally,
individuals with OCD may appraise thoughts in such a way that makes them feel personally
responsible for the intrusion. This appraisal then leads to the belief that the individual must
prevent any potential consequence that may result from the intrusion (Foa & Kozak, 1986;
OCCWG, 1997).
(2) Perfectionism and Intolerance of Uncertainty. Individuals with OCD display excessive
concern over, and have an inability to tolerate, mistakes and imperfections. Additionally,
they experience difficulty making decisions, have an inability to tolerate the unknown, and
have a strong desire for guaranteed safety (Abramowitz, Khandker, Nelson, Deacon, &
Rygwall, 2006; OCCWG, 1997).
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(3) Importance and Control of Intrusive Thoughts. Individuals with OCD believe that the mere
presence of a thought gives it status, perceived meaning, and importance. Moreover,
individuals believe they should display complete control over intrusive thoughts, and further
believe that this feat is possible to achieve (Clark & Purdon, 1993; OCCWG, 1997).

Measurement summary. In sum, extensive research has culminated in the identification
and operationalization of three domains of dysfunctional beliefs that underlie OCD. The
development of the OBQ allows for common measurement and understanding of the types of
beliefs that underlie OCD. However, findings derived from measurement of beliefs using the
OBQ are limited. That is, the OBQ only provides information regarding which belief domain(s)
appropriately classify individuals’ interpretations. The questionnaire does not allow for
measurement of interpretations of ambiguous scenarios, nor does it provide recommendations for
modification of dysfunctional interpretations.

Importance of Measuring Interpretations with Experimental Paradigms

As mentioned previously, cognitive models of OCD posit that dysfunctional
interpretations of beliefs or scenarios can contribute to the etiology and maintenance of the
disorder (Rachman, 1997). Moreover, after extensive empirical examination, the OCCWG
concluded that the primary cause of obsessions is flawed interpretations of intrusive thoughts
(OCCWG, 2003). Additionally, research suggests that obsessive-compulsive symptoms may be
related to atypical processing of threat-relevant information (Tallis, 1997) and that selective
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interpretation of ambiguous scenarios can increase anxiety vulnerability and anxiety symptoms
(MacLeod & Mathews, 2012).
The putative causal role of dysfunctional interpretations in obsessions, and the
contribution of these interpretations to the etiology and maintenance of OCD, suggests a need for
experimental investigation of how to modify beliefs successfully. Previous research suggests
that treatments that reduce OCD symptoms also reduce the strength of OC beliefs (Bouvard,
2002; Emmelkamp, van Oppen, & van Balkon, 2002; McLean et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2007).
Therefore, using experimental paradigms to modify interpretations may lessen the strength of
OC beliefs and symptomatology. Specifically, modifying intrusive beliefs related to
contamination could reduce an individual’s overestimation of threat, appraisal of feared
situations, disgust sensitivity / disgust levels, and amount of obsessions and compulsions.
Moreover, experimental findings can be used to inform clinical practice. For example,
current cognitive therapy (CT) used with individuals suffering from OCD focuses on changing
the interpretations and meanings of thoughts, thereby reducing associated anxiety and distress
(Foa, 2010). Successful demonstration of experimental modification of biases could inform
clinicians about which methods are successful in modifying or reducing dysfunctional
interpretations.

Experimental Measurement of Biased Interpretations

There have been various approaches used to measure and modify dysfunctional
interpretations, both in clinical and research settings. However, one of the most common is
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using Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) techniques. CBM is a “direct manipulation of a target
cognitive bias, by extended exposure to task contingencies that favor predetermined patterns of
processing selectivity” (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012; p. 191). CBM interventions often are used
to modify attention and interpretation biases directly (Beard, 2011) and to examine the causal
role of biases (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). CBM procedures have been deemed successful in
modifying multiple cognitive biases, including biased or dysfunctional interpretations (Beard &
Amir, 2008). Some CBM techniques include the dot-probe task (e.g., MacLeod, Mathews, &
Tata, 1986), scenario paradigm (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 1997), homograph paradigm (e.g.,
Grey & Mathews, 2000), and word sentence association (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008). The CBM
paradigms that are most commonly used to measure and modify interpretations are the scenario
paradigm (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) and the word sentence
association paradigm (WSAP; Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 2010; Beard & Amir, 2008); therefore,
these methods were be the focus of this proposal.
The association between anxiety disorders and interpretation of emotionally ambiguous
scenarios is robust and has been found using multiple CBM paradigms since 1983 (Butler &
Mathews, 1983; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). The basic mechanism underlying all CBM
approaches is extended or repeated practice on a cognitive task. Typically, participants are
presented with ambiguous information that can be interpreted as threatening (dysfunctional) or
benign and asked to respond. Responses are recorded and used to measure interpretations, which
are then compared across participants. After repeated exposure, CBM paradigms have the
capability to modify existing interpretations.
CBM paradigms, specifically CBM paradigms used to modify interpretation biases, have
been utilized across anxiety disorders; however, there is not an equal distribution of research
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across all anxiety domains. For example, there has been extensive research conducted with
individuals with social concerns (Beard & Amir, 2008), generalized social anxiety disorder
(GSAD; Amir & Taylor, 2012), spider phobia (Teachman & Addison, 2008), and generalized
anxiety disorder (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009). Conversely, relevant OCD research is
limited; to the author’s knowledge, only three published studies (Clerkin & Teachman, 2011;
Kuckertz, Amir, Tobin, & Najmi 2013; Williams & Grisham, 2013) and one unpublished study
(Amir, Kuckertz, Najmi, & Conley, 2014) examine the interpretation of ambiguous scenarios in
OCD. These studies use various paradigms to examine and modify dysfunctional interpretations
in individuals with OC-related concerns. Specific information related to the methodology and
results of these studies, and their implications for the current study, are discussed in depth in
subsequent sections.

Interpretation measurement and modification in anxiety disorders. The CBM
paradigms commonly used to measure and modify dysfunctional interpretations were used first
in the anxiety literature, specifically with social phobia, and later modified for OCD.
The scenario paradigm. Participants are assigned to groups and then presented with an
ambiguous scenario that can be resolved in a threatening or neutral way. Scenarios typically are
brief text passages that conclude in a critical sentence or word that gives the scenario meaning.
That is, the critical word or sentence changes the scenario from being categorized as ambiguous
and induces the participant to interpret it in either a threatening or neutral way. Two studies that
used this paradigm were Hirsch and Mathews (1997) and Mathews and Mackintosh (2000).
Hirsch and Mathews (1997) used a version of the scenarios paradigm to modify
interpretations in community volunteers (N = 30) with non-clinical levels of high and low
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interview anxiety in two studies. In each study, participants were presented with an ambiguous
passage related to a social scenario (e.g., a job interview) with critical sentences (e.g., As you go
into the interview you think that all of your preparation will be…) that required participants to
make decisions about whether the last word (presented as a probe) was grammatically correct.
The word would be threatening (e.g., forgotten) or non-threatening (e.g., helpful), and would
give the ambiguous passage meaning. Participants also were asked to answer comprehension
questions. Results from Study 1 indicated that individuals with low levels of anxiety displayed a
speeded response to word probes consistent with benign interpretations (F(1, 14) = 21.78, p <
.001); individuals who reported high levels of anxiety did not exhibit this difference (F(1, 14) =
0.20, p > .05; Hirsch & Mathews, 1997). These results suggest that individuals in the highanxiety group failed to show a preference for benign interpretations, which could suggest
preferential attention for information consistent with threatening interpretations. Hirsch and
Mathews (1997) suggested that the preferential attention for threat could lead to slower
responses to word probes consistent with benign interpretations because these interpretations are
inconsistent with the beliefs held by the individuals in the high-anxiety group.
In Study 2, Hirsch and Mathews (1997) included new participants (N = 24) with varying
levels of anxiety regarding interviews (high-, intermediate-, and low-anxiety) who were
presented with the same ambiguous passages. However, the probes that followed the critical
sentences were words or non-word letter strings. Participants were asked to indicate if the last
word was a real word or not. Consistent with Study 1, the probe provided meaning to the
passage and manipulated whether the participant interpreted the passage as negative or benign.
Results for Study 2 were similar to those for Study 1 in that the low- and intermediate-anxiety
groups performed similarly to one another and displayed a significant effect of probe type — that
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is, they were faster to respond to probes consistent with benign interpretations (low: F(1, 11) =
10.33, p < 0.01; intermediate: F(1, 11) = 26.54, p < 0.001), however, this finding was not present
for the high-anxiety group (F(1, 11) = 0.47, p > .05). Again, these results suggest that individuals
in the high-anxiety group failed to show a preference for benign interpretations, which may
indicate displayed preferential attention for word probes that were consistent with threatening
interpretations.
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) extended the work of Hirsch and Mathews (1997) by
modifying the scenarios used. Participants (N = 20) who were recruited from a community
sample were required to read three-line scenarios that remained ambiguous until the final word.
The critical word was either threatening or non-threatening (word valence was dependent upon
condition) and was presented as a fragment. Participants were asked to solve the fragment as
quickly as possible (e.g., bo- -ng), and then were asked a follow-up question to reinforce the
forced interpretation (e.g., “Will you be disliked by your new acquaintances?”). After
completing the training task, participants completed a recognition task in which they were asked
to rate a series of sentences in terms of their relatedness in meaning to the passages that were
read previously. In Study 1, participants were randomized into two groups: one group was led to
generate responses to the ambiguous scenario that were consistent with emotionally negative
outcomes (e.g., threatening) and the other was led to generate emotionally positive outcomes.
Results displayed a significant difference between the interpretations of the meaning of social
sentences across groups during the recognition task (Group x Valence effect: F(1,18) = 19.50, p <
.001). Specifically, participants in the threat group displayed greater endorsement of sentences
that were interpreted in a threatening manner compared to positive sentences (threatening: .85,
positive: .81). The opposite effect was seen in the positive group (threatening: .80, positive: .86).
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These results indicate that emotional interpretations can be modified, therefore suggesting that
dysfunctional interpretations (related to emotion) may also be modifiable. However, it is
important to note that although significance was reached (p < .05), the mean-level values
reported may not represent clinically significant differences (effect sizes were not reported
directly, but the absolute differences reported above appear to be relatively small).
Word-sentence association paradigm. The word-sentence association paradigm
(WSAP) is another technique used to measure and modify interpretations of ambiguous
scenarios. This technique can be used as a measurement tool of interpretation biases, or can be
used in an interpretation modification paradigm (Beard & Amir, 2008).
Beard and Amir (2008) examined the effect of multi-session interpretation training on
interpretation biases in individuals screened for elevated social phobia on the SPAI-SP (Turner,
Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989). The WSAP was used to assess for interpretation biases.
During the computer-based task, participants are shown a threatening or benign word for 500ms,
followed by an ambiguous sentence. They are then asked to indicate whether the word and
sentence are related by pressing a corresponding key. The paradigm used across sessions to
modify participants’ interpretations was the Interpretation Modification Paradigm (IMP). This
paradigm was identical to the WSAP, however there was an additional feedback component
included. Participants received feedback related to the accuracy of their answers after each trial.
If participants indicated a benign word was related to the ambiguous sentence, or a threatening
word was not related, they received positive feedback. That is, their answer was reinforced with
a computerized message indicating “That is Correct!” Conversely, participants were given
negative feedback if they indicated that a threat word was related to a sentence, or that a benign
word was not related. That is, their answer was followed by a computerized message indicating
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“That is Incorrect.” An Interpretation Control Condition (ICC) was used as the comparison
group for the IMP condition. This condition was identical to the IMP; however, the feedback
contingency was lowered to 50%, meaning participants were reinforced equally for making
threatening and benign interpretations, regardless of accuracy. The goal of the lowered feedback
contingency was to prevent interpretations from being modified in either direction.
Results indicated that participants in the IMP condition, compared to the ICC,
demonstrated greater interpretation modification as measured by a larger reduction of
endorsement of relatedness for threatening word cues in the WSAP, t(25) = 5.29, p < .001.
Furthermore, results indicated that in addition to a decreased threat-related interpretation bias
(i.e., lower relatedness of threat words), participants also displayed an increase in benign bias
(i.e., increased relatedness of benign words). The increase in benign bias was shown to have a
significant indirect effect of IMP on social anxiety symptoms. Additionally, both groups of
participants reported lower social anxiety symptoms at post-assessment compared to preassessment (IMP: t(12) = 5.16, p < .001; ICC: t(13) = 4.44, p < .001); however, participants in the
IMP condition reported significantly lower social anxiety symptoms at post-assessment as
compared to participants in the ICC condition (t(25) = 2.25, p < .04).
To test the effectiveness of the IMP further, Amir, Bomyea, and Beard (2010) examined
the effect of single-session interpretation training on individuals’ ability to disengage attention
from threatening stimuli. The study consisted of two phases: The first asked participants (N =
57) with elevated social anxiety (indicated by a score above 25 on the Liebowitz Social Anxiety
Scale – Self Report; Liebowitz, 1987), to complete a modified Posner procedure (see Amir,
Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski [2003] for description) to measure attention bias to examine
baseline bias levels. After completing this task, participants were randomized into two groups
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(IMP or ICC) to complete the interpretation modification. Attention bias was re-measured to
assess the effect of IMP on participants’ attentional bias. Results indicated that participants in
the IMP condition were less likely to endorse negative social situations after the modification
(t(28) = 2.4, p < .03, d = .91), but this change was not seen in the ICC condition (t(27) = -.34, p =
.74). Furthermore, participants in the IMP condition demonstrated reduced attention bias for
threatening stimuli (t(55) = 2.3, p < .03, d = .62) as measured by speeded response to invalidly
cued social threat words, compared to the ICC group. These results support the notion that
interpretation is malleable even via one-session training. Additionally, the results highlight that
interpretation modification can generalize to related tasks, including disengagement from
threatening stimuli.
In sum, researchers have implemented various interpretation modification techniques
across several anxiety disorders. Both single- and multi-session protocols have identified the
effectiveness of interpretation training in reducing negative interpretation bias, with surprisingly
robust interpretive change shown after only one session of training (MacLeod & Mathews,
2012). These training effects have been shown to persist for 24 hours following single-session
treatments (e.g., Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006; Yiend, Mackintosh, &
Mathews, 2005), and from a few days (Beard & Amir, 2008; Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, &
Prantzalou, 2009) to one week (e.g., Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 2007) following
multi-session treatment.

Experimental interpretation measurement and modification in OCD. Numerous
research gains related to interpretation modification have been made across the anxiety disorders.
However, examination of the effect of CBM for dysfunctional interpretations in OCD is limited.
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Kuckertz and colleagues (2013) developed a self-report measure of interpretation bias for OCsymptoms: the Word Sentence Association test for OCD (WASO). This measure is similar to
the word-sentence association experimental paradigms that have been used with other anxiety
disorders. The WASO includes 20 OC-related ambiguous sentences (e.g., “You see a spot of dirt
on your rug”; 10 paired with a threat word, 10 with a neutral word (e.g., “paint”). Participants
are asked to rate the relatedness of the provided word to the sentence using a 7-point scale
ranging from 1 (Not at all Related) to 7 (Very Much Related).
The WASO was examined in two studies (see Kuckertz et al., 2013). In Study 1, the
performance of the WASO across three groups of analogue participants was examined. The
three groups were: (1) an OC group (n = 38) comprised of participants with high scores (M =
27.00; SD = 9.36) on the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – Revised; (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002);
(2) a matched anxiety and depression group (MAD group; n = 34) comprised of participants with
similar anxiety and depression scores (e.g., BDI-II score ≥ 8) to the OC group, but low OC
symptoms (OCI-R score ≤ 10); and (3) a control group (n = 31) comprised of participants who
had low anxiety, depression (BDI-II score ≤ 7), and OC symptoms (OCI-R score ≤ 11). Results
indicated that the groups differed significantly on their ratings of relatedness of threat words [F
(2, 100) = 16.04, p < .001]. Specifically, the OC group rated the threat words as more related to
the sentences than the MAD group (t(70) = 5.14, p < .001) and the control group (t(67) = 4.97, p <
.001).
In Study 2, the predictive properties of the WASO on participants’ willingness to engage
in a contamination-related behavioral approach task (BAT) were measured. A new group of
participants, students from San Diego State University with a range of OCD symptoms (N = 70),
were asked to complete a battery of questionnaires, including the WASO and the OCI-R.
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Additionally, participants completed three BATs, each of which assessed avoidance associated
with a different contaminant using a graduated hierarchy (Cougle, Wolitzky-Taylor, Lee, &
Telch, 2007; Najmi et al., 2012). Results indicated that threat relatedness ratings on the WASO
were better at predicting avoidance behavior on the BAT (β = -.39, t = 2.58, p = .012) than
endorsement of the washing subscale on the OCI-R (β = -.19, t = 1.57, p = .121). These findings
suggest that situation interpretation may be more useful in predicting avoidance behavior than
symptom measures (Kuckertz et al., 2013).
The findings of the two studies completed by Kuckertz and colleagues (2013) indicate
that individuals with contamination concerns endorse threatening stimuli as being more related to
ambiguous scenarios. Moreover, heightened endorsement was shown to be a better predictor of
BAT performance than a self-report of OC washing symptoms. These findings support cognitive
models of OCD, which suggest that interpretations of beliefs are deeply implicated in OC
symptomatology.
Clerkin and Teachman (2011) examined the ability to modify interpretations in
individuals with OC symptoms using OC-related ambiguous scenarios that ended in a word
fragment (e.g., nor_al). Undergraduate participants with elevated OCI-R Scores (scores > 28.01,
which is the mean score of individuals diagnosed with OCD in Foa et al., 2002) were required to
solve the word fragment, which resolved the ambiguity of the scenario in a way that was
consistent with negative OC-interpretations (i.e., endorsing dysfunctional beliefs), or inconsistent
with negative OC-interpretations (i.e., rejecting dysfunctional beliefs). Participants were asked
to complete an interpretation measure (Interpretations Intrusions Inventory [III]; OCCWG, 2003,
2005) and the positive or neutral training paradigm. Both paradigms required participants to
read 64 scenarios related to an array of common triggers for individuals with OCD. Each
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scenario included a word fragment at the end that participants had to complete in order to move
on to the next scenario. In the positive training paradigm, all word fragments allowed the
scenarios to be resolved in a way inconsistent with negative OC-interpretations, whereas the
neutral (control) paradigm had a 50/50 contingency, meaning half of the scenarios could be
resolved in a way that was inconsistent with negative interpretations, and half of the scenarios
could be resolved in a way that was consistent with negative interpretations. After the training,
participants completed additional questionnaires, including the OBQ-44 and a recognition-rating
(10 new scenarios) task that provided measurement of the amount of modification of
participants’ interpretation biases. Results indicated that individuals who completed the positive
training paradigm reported more benign interpretations and fewer dysfunctional interpretations in
the recognition-rating task than participants who completed the neutral training paradigm (OC
Positive: t(98) = 3.82, p < .001, d = 0.76; OC Neutral: t(98) = 3.00, p = .003, d = 0.60). These
findings suggest that dysfunctional interpretations related to OC-related scenarios are at least
somewhat malleable, and that CBM can be successfully used to modify interpretations in
individuals with OC concerns/symptoms.
Williams and Grisham (2013) used methodology similar to that of Clerkin and Teachman
(2011). Study participants (N = 89) consisted of an adult volunteer sample recruited from the
community who did not report severe depression, suicidal ideation, substance use, or psychosis.
The scenarios were based on the OBQ-44, covered broad belief domains, and were pilot tested
prior to the experiment. Similar to Clerkin and Teachman (2011), participants were randomized
into the positive or neutral training condition and asked to resolve the ambiguity of the presented
scenario by solving a word fragment that would provide a positive or threatening resolution, and
then complete a comprehension question. As an extension of Clerkin and Teachman (2011),
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Williams and Grisham (2013) included three behavioral tasks that were designed to tap into three
belief domains: (1) a thought-action fusion induction to assess Importance of Thoughts/Control
Beliefs, (2) a timed task in which participants were asked to provide a summary of the study for
future participants to assess Perfectionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty Beliefs, and (3) a timed
cleaning task in which participants were instructed to clean the computer keyboard and mouse
using disinfectant wipes to assess Contamination/Estimation of Threat Beliefs. Results indicated
that participants in the positive condition demonstrated a change in interpretation toward more
positive and less negative interpretations compared to control participants (t(76) = 2.91, p < .01, d
= .66). However, consistent differences on behavioral task performance were not found between
groups. Specifically, analysis of performance on the Perfectionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty
task did not yield differences between conditions (χ2(1) = 0.01, p > .05), nor were differences
found on the amount of time spent cleaning (Positive condition: M = 57.64, SD = 29.83; Control:
M = 55.09, SD = 27.61; ps >.05) or the amount of wipes used (Positive condition: M = 1.32, SD
= .57; Control: M = 1.38, SD = 0.55; ps >.05) in the Contamination/Estimation of Threat task.
However, during the Importance/Control of Thoughts task, differences between mean ratings of
distress (positive: M = 3.85, SD = 0.97; control: M = 4.32 SD = 0.88) and urge to neutralize
(positive: M = 3.37, SD = 1.00; control: M = 3.86, SD = 1.10) were found between conditions
(t(75)s > 2.03, p < .05).
Finally, and most recently, Amir, Kuckertz, Najmi, and Conley (2015) examined the
effects of a multi-session interpretation training as part of a larger treatment study with
participants who reported clinical levels of OCD. The computerized interpretation paradigms
used in the study were similar to the WSAP and IMP used in the social anxiety literature,
however, the stimuli were selected by participants to be ideographically relevant to their personal
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OCD concerns. Participants completed the WSAP before and after two sessions of IMP training,
completed on separate days with at least one day in between the sessions, to assess change in
interpretation. After each training session, participants were asked to complete a self-conducted
exposure exercise selected from an exposure hierarchy with ideographic items created by the
participant. Results indicated that there was a significant change in bias index (to achieve the
bias index, threat relatedness scores were subtracted from benign relatedness scores) over two
sessions (t(12) = 4.79, p < 0.001, d = 2.42), as well as a significant decrease in the distress
reported by participants during self-conducted exposures compared to self-conducted exposures
completed with the computerized control paradigm (t(20) = 3.75, p < .001). These results are
relevant to the current study in that they indicate that computerized word-sentence association
assessment and training paradigms can be successful in modifying OC-related interpretations.

Limitations of Current OCD Interpretation Research

Interpretation research in OCD literature is minimal compared to research across other
anxiety domains. The few studies that have examined interpretation modification in individuals
with OC concerns offer promising results, albeit with limitations. The first limitation of extant
research is the use of questionnaire-based assessments of the effects of interpretation
modification paradigms. Self-report measures, particularly those that assess trait-like or stable
variables, are helpful but not necessarily sensitive to certain aspects of subtle changes (e.g., a
small change in interpretation bias), or temporal sequencing. Using a computerized assessment
of interpretation and associated biases allows researchers to record endorsement ratings and
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reaction times to detect changes in interpretation, as well as their direction. This limitation was
addressed by Amir et al. (2015). However, this study utilized idiographic stimuli, and although
successful in modifying biases, the stimuli may not generalize to a broader population.
Another limitation of current research is that the behavioral effects of specific
dysfunctional interpretation modification have not been examined. Williams and Grisham
(2013) examined the effect of Cognitive Behavioral Modification Interpretation training (CBMI) on various behavioral tasks; however, participants were not required to endorse elevated OC
symptomatology. Furthermore, the behavioral tasks that participants completed were not
specialized and were not directly related to the OC symptomatology that participants were
expressing; this lack of match is a limitation because individuals who do not express
symptomatology related to the task will often not express difficultly completing the task, which
can skew results and lead to null findings. The relationship between interpretation bias and
performance on a BAT has been measured (Kuckertz et al., 2013), but the effect of modification
(e.g., anxiety or disgust reduction) has not. Amir and colleagues (2015) measured the effect of
interpretation bias change on distress during a self-conducted exposure exercise. However,
distress was measured as a single rating, which did not allow for both anxiety and disgust to be
measured. Lastly, the study design, particularly the nesting of the interpretation training within a
larger treatment, may be a limitation in that data may be confounded by participants’
participation in other aspects of the study.
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Current Study

The current study utilized methods and extended findings from the social anxiety and
OCD literatures. It broadly explored interpretation biases in individuals with elevated
contamination concerns, the ability to modify biases, and the effect of modification on
participants’ willingness to approach a feared situation. Specifically, the WSAP (Amir et al.,
2015; Beard & Amir, 2008) was used with stimuli adapted for individuals with obsessivecompulsive concerns to measure baseline interpretation biases and bias change. The IMP and
ICC paradigms (Beard & Amir, 2008) were used to measure and manipulate dysfunctional
interpretations of stimuli adapted for individuals with obsessive-compulsive concerns. The
effects of the manipulation was measured using three contamination-related BATs that
encourage participants to approach feared situations and analyze participants’ anxiety and
disgust levels at each stage (see Najmi & Amir, 2010; Najmi et al., 2012). Measuring both
disgust and anxiety levels throughout the BAT would allow for further insight into which
mechanisms, if any, are affected by modifying interpretations.
The current research had three major aims. The first is to examine the ability to modify
dysfunctional and benign interpretations using a CBM technique, word-sentence association,
within an experimental design. Previous research suggests that the etiology and maintenance of
obsessions can be a result of misinterpreting the importance of thoughts in a dysfunctional way
(e.g., Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis 1985). Moreover, dysfunctional interpretations may also be
represented as a failure to make a benign interpretation of an ambiguous event (Amir, Provost, &
Kuckertz, 2012). Thus, being able to reduce or eliminate threatening endorsements may help
decrease dysfunctional interpretations, which could have implications for OCD symptomatology.
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CBM has been used to successfully measure cognitive processes (e.g., interpretation) and
research has shown that it is possible to manipulate OC-relevant beliefs via experimentation
(e.g., Clerkin & Teachman, 2011). Therefore, participants who successfully complete an active
interpretation modification paradigm, compared to control participants, should show a decrease
in dysfunctional interpretations as measured by the level of endorsement of threatening
interpretations following the presentation of ambiguous scenarios. Additionally, completing an
active interpretation modification paradigm should facilitate an increase in benign bias, or benign
interpretations.
Based on the above information, it is hypothesized that: (1a) participants who complete
the active interpretation paradigm would display a significant reduction in an interpretation bias
for threatening information; (1b) participants who complete the control condition would not
show such a decrease, and (1c) participants who complete the active interpretation paradigm
would display a significant increase in an interpretation bias for benign information; (1d)
participants who complete the control condition would not show such an increase.
The second aim of the current study is to examine the effect of interpretation
modification on participants’ willingness to approach feared situations during a contaminationrelated BAT. Previous research supports the efficacy of using CBM procedures (e.g.,
interpretation modification) to modify information processing in general, and interpretations
specifically (e.g., Amir & Taylor, 2012; Grey & Mathews, 2000). Moreover, experimental
manipulation of OC beliefs has been shown to have substantial cognitive, behavioral, and
emotional consequences (Clerkin & Teachman, 2011). These findings suggest that by
manipulating interpretations of ambiguous situations, the effects should translate to the BATs,
during which participants were encouraged to interpret the perceived contaminants and decide
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how to react to them (e.g., touch them or not). Therefore, participants who complete the active
interpretation training, compared to those who complete the control condition, should be able to
complete more steps in BATs during which they were asked to come in contact with
contaminants using a graduated hierarchy of steps.
Based on the above information in support of aim two, it is hypothesized that (2)
participants who complete the active interpretation paradigm, compared to the control, would
complete more steps on average in the BATs.
The third aim of the current study is to examine the effect of interpretation modification
on anxiety and disgust levels during the BATs across conditions. Presumably, if manipulation of
OC beliefs has behavioral and emotional consequences, participants who are in the active
condition of the training should be able to interact with the contaminants in each stage of the
BAT with lower levels of anxiety and disgust than individuals in the control group (Clerkin &
Teachman, 2011). Reports of anxiety and disgust experienced during the behavioral approach
task were assessed.
Given the information in support of study aim three, it is hypothesized that (3a)
participants who complete the active interpretation paradigm would report lower anxiety scores
during the BAT than individuals in the control condition and (3b) participants who complete the
active interpretation paradigm would report lower disgust scores during the BAT than
individuals in the control condition.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD

Participants

Participants who completed the study were 242 undergraduate students enrolled in
introductory psychology courses at Northern Illinois University (NIU). The present analyses
only used participants who endorsed elevated contamination concerns (n = 97). Of the
individuals with elevated contamination concerns, only those who did not report a current
diagnosis of OCD and successfully completed all portions of the study were retained. Three
participants were removed from analyses due to a current OCD diagnoses, six were removed due
to study errors/incomplete data sets, and fourteen were removed for participant noncompliance
(e.g., lack of repose variability during computer tasks, missing validity questions). The final
sample size was 74. The following demographics are listed for this final sample. The sample
was predominantly female (81.1%) and participants had a mean age of 19.38 (range 18 to 28).
For participants who identified their race (n = 70), 30.1% identified as European
American/White, 37.1% identified as African American/Black, 14.3% identified as Asian
American, 1.4% identified as Native American, 11.4% identified as multi-racial, and 5.7%
identified as “other”.
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Self-Report Measures

The Vancouver Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004).
The VOCI is comprised of 55 items related to the domains of OC symptomatology. Individuals
are asked to rate how true each item is for them using a 5-point scale, which ranges from 0 (Not
at All) to 4 (Very Much). The VOCI can be used to obtain a total obsessional score, or six factor
scores, one for each of the following domains: checking (e.g., I repeatedly check and recheck
things like taps and switches after turning them off), contamination (e.g., I feel very dirty after
touching money) obsessions (e.g., I am often upset by my unwanted thoughts or images of sexual
acts), hoarding, (e.g., I have trouble carrying out normal household activities because my home
is so cluttered with things I have collected), just right (e.g., I often have trouble getting things
done because I try to do everything exactly right), and indecisiveness (e.g., After I have decided
something, I usually worry about my decision for a long time). A participant’s score can range
from 0 (absence of symptoms) to 220 (maximum presence of symptoms) across all domains.
The VOCI has been shown to have adequate psychometric properties in both clinical and
nonclinical samples. The total score and subscales have demonstrated good test–retest reliability
over an average of 47 days (rs > .90) and internal consistency (coefficient α = .85 to .96;
Thordarson et al., 2004, 1980) in clinical samples. In nonclinical student samples, the VOCI has
shown to have good internal consistency, with alpha coefficients ranging from .83 to .96 for the
total score and subscales (Thordarson et al., 2004). The VOCI has shown good convergent
validity in a student sample as evidenced by strong, significant correlations with the Padua
Inventory, Washington State University Revision (PI-WSUR; Burns, Keortge, Formea, &
Sternberger, 1995; r =.79, p < .001) and the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory
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(MOCI; Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; r =.64, p < .001). The VOCI has demonstrated relative
discriminant validity in a student sample as evidenced by moderate correlations with measures of
depression and anxiety (rs = .43 to .44).
The VOCI Contamination subscale was used as a screening measure for participant
inclusion. This subscale consists of 12 items and has been shown to be unifactorial in both
student and OCD samples. Mean scores on the contamination subscale in the OCD population
are 19.41 (12.51), and are 7.31 (6.82) in the student population. The subscale showed strong
convergent and discriminant validity in student samples, as evidenced by high correlations with
the PI-WSUR contamination/washing subscale (r =.85), and the MOCI washing subscale (r
=.59), and weak correlations with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1993a; r
=.27) and Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993b; r =.31).

The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). The OCIR is a shortened version of the original Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (OCI) that contained 42
items. The OCI-R is comprised of statements about everyday life that are relevant to general
obsessive symptoms. The statements span six obsessive-compulsive domains: checking (e.g., I
check things more often than necessary), washing (e.g., I wash my hands more often and longer
than necessary), ordering (e.g., I get upset if objects are not arranged properly), obsessing (e.g.,
I find it difficult to control my own thoughts), mental neutralizing (e.g., There are good and bad
numbers), and hoarding (e.g., I have saved up so many things they get in the way). Participants
are asked to rate how distressed or bothered they have felt by the experience described in each
statement during the past month using a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely).
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Scores can range from 0 (absence of distress) to 72 (maximum distress in all experiences
described).
The OCI-R generally has been shown to have adequate or better psychometric properties
(Foa et al., 2002). The subscales display good internal consistency, with coefficient alphas
ranging from .70s to low .80s (Wu & Carter, 2008). Moreover, moderate correlations among
subscales suggest that a relationship between the subscales is present, but that the scales are not
redundant. The OCI-R shows good temporal stability and test-retest reliability, with one-week
correlations ranging from .74 to .91 in students. Wu and Carter (2008) reported that the OCI-R
displayed moderate correlations with general distress scales (Mood and Anxiety Symptom
Questionnaire [MASQ]; Watson & Clark, 2001) and low to moderate correlations (rs = .14 to
.32) with depression, which suggests adequate discriminant validity. The OCI-R also displayed
good convergent validity as evidenced by correlations with other measures of OC-symptoms
including the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al., 1989; r =
.53), the National Institute of Mental Health Global Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (GOCS;
Goodman & Prince, 1992; r = .66), and the MOCI (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; r = .85).

The Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale – Revised (DPSS-R Fergus &
Valentiner, 2009) The DPSS-R is a 12-item scale revised from the original 32-item Disgust
Propensity an Sensitivity Scale (DPSS) developed by Cavanagh & Davey (2000). The DPSS-R
measures two distinct factors that contribute to disgust reactions, disgust propensity (DP; e.g., I
avoid disgusting things) and disgust sensitivity (DS; e.g., When I feel disgusted, I worry that I
might pass out). Participants respond to the measure by rating how often each statement is true
for them personally using a 5-point scale ranging from Never to Always. Six of the total items
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are summed to measure DP while the other items are summed to measure DS. For both scales,
higher scores indicate more disgust.
The DPSS-R displays good internal consistency when examining DP (α = .83), and DS (α
= .80), and the DP and DS scales displayed moderate to strong relation with one another (r =
.59). Moreover, the DPSS-R demonstrates adequate representational validity as evidenced by
the DP and DS scales consistently correlating with symptoms of disgust-relevant phobias, such
as blood and rat phobias (Z-statistics for pairwise comparisons ranged from 1.74 to 4.28; ps <.05;
Fergus & Valentiner, 2009). Furthermore, the DP and DS scales correlated with disgust
symptoms related to phobias with a higher magnitude compared to fear symptoms related to
phobias.

The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977).
The CES-D is 20-item self-report questionnaire designed to measure symptoms associated with
depression that a participant has experienced in the past week. The items comprise six subscales
that measure major components of depression including depressed mood (e.g., I felt depressed),
feelings of guilt and worthlessness (e.g., I thought my life had been a failure), feelings of
helplessness and hopelessness (e.g., I felt I could not shake off the blues even with help from my
family or friends), psychomotor retardation (e.g., I could not get ‘going’), loss of appetite (e.g., I
did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor), and sleep disturbance (e.g., My sleep was
restless). Participants are asked to report on how often they experienced the feelings or
behaviors listed on a four-point scale ranging from Rarely or none of the time (less than one day)
to Most of all of the time (5-7 days). The possible range of scores is 0 to 60, with higher scores
indicating more depression-related symptomatology.
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The CES-D has been shown to have high internal consistency (α = .80-.90; Radloff,
1977). Moreover, the measure has shown to have good convergent validity as evidenced by
moderate to high correlations with other self-report and interview measures of depression,
including the Lubin (rs = .43-.51; Lubin, 1967), and Bradburn Negative Affect (rs =.60-.63;
Bradburn, 1969). Furthermore, the CES-D showed sound discriminant validity as evidenced by
low negative correlations with the Bradburn Positive Affect (rs =-.21to -.25; Bradburn, 1969);
participants’ self-reported social functioning (rs =.13-.19; Radloff, 1977) and interviewer’s
ratings of participant cooperation (rs =-.05 to -.13; Radloff, 1977). The CES-D was used to
assess whether participants in the active and control groups are similar in their report of
depression symptoms.

The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec,
1990). The PSWQ is a 16-item questionnaire developed to measure trait worry using the
following dimensions: excessiveness, generality, and uncontrollable nature. Each item is rated
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Not at all Typical of Me) to 5 (Very Typical of Me). Scores
can range from 16 (absence of worry) to 80 (presence of extreme worry). The PSWQ has shown
strong internal consistency in both nonclinical (alpha coefficients range: .90 to .95; Ladouceur et
al., 1992; Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994) and clinical samples (alpha coefficients
range: .86 to .93; Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992). The PSWQ has shown sound convergent
validity as demonstrated by moderate –to- high correlations with other constructs related to
pervasive worry including the tension subscale (r = .36, p <.02) on the Self-Analysis
Questionnaire (SAQ; Lovibond, 1983) and the Emotional Control Questionnaire (ECQ; Rapee,
Craske, & Barlow, 1989; r = -.53, p <.001).The PSWQ also displayed sound discriminant
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validity as demonstrated by low correlations with the anxiety subscale (r = .11) and depression
subscale (r = .15) of the SAQ (Brown, et al., 1992). In the current study, the PSWQ was used to
ensure that the participants in each condition are experiencing similar levels of worry.

The Demographic Data Questionnaire (DDQ). The DDQ is 16-item self-report
questionnaire that was developed for the purposes of this study to acquire basic demographic
information from study participants. Individuals were asked questions about their sex, age,
marital status, religion, race, and employment status. Furthermore, participants were asked a
brief set of questions to determine their current substance use and to determine if they have
received psychological or psychiatric treatment, either past or current.

Computerized Measures

Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Amir, Bomyea & Beard, 2010;
Beard & Amir, 2008). The WSAP is a computerized cognitive-behavioral modification
technique designed to assess participants’ interpretation biases by pairing threatening or benign
words with ambiguous sentences. Word cues and sentences used are related to relevant
contamination concerns and were collected and pilot tested by Dr. Amir at San Diego State
University. After the initial pilot was completed, the primary investigator re-piloted the stimuli
with undergraduate students at Northern Illinois University. A total of 40 sentences that
described ambiguous scenarios (e.g., I picked up something someone dropped) were developed,
and two word cues, one threatening (e.g., germs) and one benign (e.g., helpful), were selected
and paired with each sentence, creating a total of 80 word-sentence pairs. This assessment was
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given to participants before and after training to measure pre-and post-training levels of
interpretation bias.
Each WSAP trial consisted of four steps. First, participants were presented with a
fixation cross to direct their attention to the center of the computer screen and alert them that a
trial is beginning. The fixation cross was presented for 500ms. Second, the cross disappeared
and participants were presented with a word cue that appeared in the center of the screen for
500ms. Third, participants were presented with an ambiguous sentence that remained on the
screen until they pressed the space bar to indicate that they finished reading the sentence.
Finally, participants were prompted with the following question: Were the word and sentence
related? and were asked to answer by pressing the “1” key if they thought the word and
sentence were related, or by pressing the “3” key if they thought the word and sentence were not
related (see Figure 1). The next trial began immediately following the participant’s response.
All text was presented in 12-point font on a grey background. A percentage score was computed
for each participant to depict the amount of threat and benign items endorsed at the pre and post
assessments.
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I pick up something someone has dropped.
(Participant presses spacebar)
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E

Was the word related to the sentence?
(Participant presses #1 ‘related’ or #3 ‘not related’)

Figure 1: Word Sentence Association Paradigm Trial

Interpretation Modification Paradigm (IMP; Beard & Amir, 2008): The active
interpretation paradigm used in the current study was identical to WSAP (described above) with
the exception that participants received feedback about their responses after each trial.
Additionally, 80 novel contamination-related word-sentence pairs were used to prevent practice
or transference effects from the pre-assessment. The IMP followed the same procedure as the
WSAP, however, after the participants indicated whether or not the word and sentence were
related, they received response-specific feedback. That is, participants received positive
feedback (“You are Correct!”) when they responded to threatening word cues by indicating they
were not related to the ambiguous sentence (pressing “3”) and to benign word cues by indicating
they were related (pressing “1”; see Figure 2). Furthermore, participants received negative
feedback (“You are Incorrect.”) when they responded to threatening word cues by indicating
they were related to the ambiguous sentence (pressing “1”) and to benign word cues by
indicating they were not related (pressing “3”). The purpose of the feedback contingency was to
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reinforce the benign interpretation bias and extinguish the threat interpretation bias (Beard &
Amir, 2008). This paradigm is being used because it has successfully reduced interpretation bias
for threatening information in individuals with social anxiety (see Beard & Amir, 2008). The
paradigm has not been used with individuals with contamination concerns; however, a paper
version of the assessment task has (WASO; Kuckertz et al., 2013).

Interpretation Control Condition (ICC; Beard & Amir, 2008). The interpretation
control paradigm, the ICC, is identical to the IMP (described above) with the exception of the
feedback contingency being lowered to 50%. That is, participants received positive feedback
when they endorsed threat interpretations half of the time, and when they rejected threat
interpretations half the time. By reinforcing participants in the control group equally for making
threat and benign interpretations, the aim was that interpretations would not be significantly
changed in either direction. This control condition has been used with participants with social
anxiety, and has been shown to be an appropriate comparison for the active condition (Beard &
Amir, 2008).

36

+
500ms
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I pick up something someone has dropped.
(Participant presses spacebar)

TIME
E

Was the word related to the sentence?
(Participant presses #3 ‘not related’)

You are Correct!

Figure 2. Interpretation Modification Paradigm Trial with Positive Reinforcement

Behavioral Measures

Behavioral Approach Tasks (BATs). Three BATs were used to assess participants’
ability to approach three types of contaminants. These BATs were a replication of the BATs
used in Najmi and Amir (2010) and were originally adapted from Cougle et al. (2007). The first
BAT consisted of a pile of dirty laundry. Before they were asked to interact with the laundry,
participants were told some of these items may have been touched with bodily fluids. The second
BAT consisted of a mixture of dirt, dead insects, and cat hair. The third BAT consisted of a new,
unused toilet (with an open lid) that was made to look dirty with blotches of potting soil.
Participants were asked to touch the seat of the toilet. Each BAT included six hierarchical steps
ranging from touching the contaminant with a tissue to touching the contaminant and then
touching one’s own face (see Table 1). If participants completed the first step, they were asked

37

to complete the second step and so on; however, participants were able to discontinue the task at
any time. After each attempted step, participants were asked to rate their peak anxiety and
disgust on two separate scales ranging from 0 to 100 (0 indicating no anxiety/disgust and 100
indicating extreme anxiety/disgust). After each BAT, participants were given a tissue to wipe
their hands to prevent carry over effects from one BAT to the next. Instructions for the BAT are
as follows (taken from Najmi et al., 2012, p. 230):
What I’m going to ask you to do now is a test of your ability to approach a feared
situation for as long as you comfortably can. It is not a test of courage. You are free to refuse to
engage in the task, so you can end the task at any point. If you do wish to stop the task, please
let me know.
The BATs were scored by calculating a percentage score for each participant. There are 18 total
steps participants may complete, 6 per phase; the numbers of steps completed during each BAT
were computed to a percentage as well as the total number of steps completed.
These BATs have been shown to have good psychometric properties including high
internal consistency (α = .86) between the four BAT variables: (1) percentage of steps avoided,
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Table 1. Behavioral Approach Tasks (Najmi & Amir, 2010)
1. Dirty Laundry
Step 1

Touch laundry with a
sheet of tissue

2. Dirt, dead insects,
and cat hair mixture
Touch mixture with a
sheet of tissue

3. Toilet Seat

Step 2

Touch laundry with a
finger

Touch mixture with a
finger

Touch toilet seat with a
finger

Step 3

Touch laundry with
one hand

Touch mixture with one
hand

Touch toilet seat with
one hand

Step 4

Touch laundry with
both hands

Touch mixture with both
hands

Touch toilet seat with
both hands

Step 5

Touch laundry, then
touch arms and chest

Touch mixture, then
touch arms and chest

Touch toilet seat, then
touch arms and chest

Step 6

Touch laundry, then
touch face

Touch mixture, then
touch face

Touch toilet seat, then
touch face

Touch toilet seat with a
sheet of tissue

(2) mean anxiety, (3) mean disgust, and (4) composite BAT score which was calculated by
summing the standardized values of percentage of steps avoided with the mean anxiety and
disgust scores (Najmi et al., 2012). Furthermore, the BATs displayed convergent validity as
measured by correlations with the MOCI cleaning subscale (rs = .36 - .48) and discriminant
validity as evidenced by low correlations with the BDI (rs < .07) and low to moderate
correlations with the non-washing MOCI subscales (rs = .01-.25; Najmi et al., 2012).
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Procedure

When participants arrived at the study location, they were asked to read a consent form
that highlighted the general goals of the study and provide written informed consent. Participants
were then asked to provide basic demographic information and to complete a battery of selfreport questionnaires via a secure online platform. Following completion of the questionnaires,
the experimenter administered the pre-assessment of interpretation bias using the WSAP. Upon
completion of the pre-assessment, participants were randomly assigned to either the IMP or the
ICC, and the experimenter administered the appropriate interpretation training (active or
control). When participants completed the training paradigm, the WSAP was e re-administered
in order to assess for bias change. After all computerized measures were completed; the
experimenter led participants to a different room to complete the three BATs. Upon completion
or termination of the BATs, participants were taken back to the original room for debriefing.
During debriefing, the experimenter provided both verbal and written information (i.e., they
summarized the debriefing form and answer any questions raised), which explained the goals of
the experiment and instances of deception.
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CHAPTER 3
STATISTICAL ANALYSES

Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses
Data analysis began by examining and addressing missing data. Little’s MCAR test
(Little, 1988) was used to identify patterns of missing data. Because data appeared to be missing
at random (see results more for information), the Expectation Maximization (EM) Method was
used to fill missing values and maximize data usage. This method forms a correlation matrix
with missing data by assuming the shape of a distribution and basing inferences of missing data
on the likelihood under that distribution. To determine the expectations that will then replace
missing data, two steps are completed for each iteration. Each step and associated
recommendations were followed as outlined in Tabachnick and Fidell (2013). Data were also
examined and screened for chronic statistical outliers (i.e., 3 SD above the mean) by analyzing
descriptive statistics and boxplots using SPSS outliers function. Following analysis of missing
data and outliers, data were examined using Q-Q plots, histograms, and skewness and kurtosis
(e.g., values greater than or equal to 2.58) tests for normality of the distribution. Additionally,
variance was examined across conditions (e.g., large variance/ small variance <2) to ensure that
variability of responding to measures was consistent. Following this, basic psychometric
properties of each measure, including means, standard deviations, and estimates of internal
consistency were examined for each of the study measures.
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (active modification or
control); therefore, it was not expected that groups would differ systematically on any critical
baseline variables. To empirically test for equality across groups, a series of one-way ANOVAs
was conducted to determine if significant differences were present on relevant variables,
including contamination symptoms (VOCI), overall OC-scores (OCI-R), disgust propensity
(DPSS-R), depression (CES-D), worry (PSWQ), and current treatment status.

Primary Data Analyses

All analyses were conducted using SPSS 21.0. To test the hypotheses that individuals
who complete the active paradigm would display a significant decrease in interpretation biases
for threatening information whereas those in the control condition would not (1a & 1b), threat
endorsement ratings from the WSAP were submitted to a 2(Group: IMP v ICC) x 2(Time: Pre v
Post) ANOVA. A significant (p < .05) Group X Time interaction would suggest that
interpretation biases for threat were different across condition. Pairwise comparisons were then
conducted using paired samples t-tests to determine IMP and ICC group change. A second
ANOVA was conducted to test the hypotheses that individuals who complete the active
paradigm would display a significant increase in interpretation biases for benign information,
whereas those in the control condition would not (1c & 1d). Benign endorsement ratings from
the WSAP were submitted to a 2(Group: IMP v ICC) x 2(Time: Pre v Post) ANOVA. A
significant (p < .05) Group X Time interaction would suggest that interpretation biases for
benign cues were different across conditions. Pairwise comparisons were conducted using
paired samples t-tests to determine IMP and ICC group change.
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The next step in the primary analyses was to conduct a third ANOVA to examine the
effect of group on BAT performance. Specifically, to test Hypothesis 2, that participants in the
active paradigm would complete more steps in the BAT than would participants in the control
condition, the mean total number of steps completed during the BAT was submitted to a
2(Group: IMP v ICC) x 2(BAT type: BAT1, BAT3) ANOVA with repeated measurement on the
second factor. BAT2 was examined independently due to smaller sample size (a result of
participant allergies to the stimuli). Results would display the effect of training on each of the
three BATs to see if the participants in the IMP group performed differently than those in the
ICC group on each of the three stages. Additionally, if a significant (p < .05) Group X BAT type
interaction is present, follow-up analyses of pairwise comparisons will be completed.
Specifically, comparisons of group pairs will be completed via a two-step method with
Discriminate Analysis to assess differences in performance across the BATs.
The final hypotheses, that participants who complete the active training would report
lower anxiety and lower disgust scores, on average, during the BATs than would individuals in
the control condition (3a and 3b), would be examined using mean-level analysis. Specifically,
mean-level anxiety and disgust scores would be computed for each of the BAT stages (3 total),
and each step of the BATs (18 total). These mean scores would then be submitted to
independent samples t-tests to compare differences across group for the total BAT for both
anxiety and disgust scores. A significant (p < .05) independent samples t-test comparing the
overall mean anxiety scores of each group, as well as a significant independent samples t-test
comparing the overall mean disgust scores of each group, would constitute a rejection of the null
hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

Data Screening and Preliminary Analyses

Data Screening. Missing Values Analysis (MVA) indicated that .05% of data were
missing, with 49 of 163 variables having at least one missing value. Little’s MCAR test (Little,
1988) was then completed, and results suggested that data were missing completely at random
(χ2 = 17.23, df = 6940, p > .99). To address the limited amount of missing data, the Expectation
Maximization (EM) method was utilized. During this procedure, each dataset converged in less
than 35 iterations. Once data were imputed at the item level, total scores were computed and
outlier analysis of questionnaire data occurred. This analysis indicated that all participants’
scores were within 3 SD from the mean and chronic outliers were not present on any of the
variables. Additionally, all data met the assumption of normality, were not significantly skewed
or kurtotic (i.e., skew < 2.58), and variance for all measures across conditions was within
appropriate range, suggesting that variation in responding across conditions was consistent.

Descriptive Statistics. Basic psychometric properties are reported in Table 2 for the
entire sample; Table 3 presents these data separately for participants in the IMP (active) and ICC
(control) conditions. Overall, measures evidenced acceptable internal consistency in the total
sample, with the median value being .86. The VOCI contamination subscale was the lone
exception (α = .67). Regarding range of questionnaire scores, responses reflected a fairly broad
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistency for the Full Sample
Scale (# of items) N
M
SD
Range
Alpha AIC
VOCI-CTM (12) 74
22.50
6.65
14-36
.67
.14
OCI-R (18)
74
21.23
11.47
0-49
.86
.25
OCI-R-Washing
74
3.92
2.73
0-11
.75
.50
(3)
CES-D (20)
74
38.54
9.16
20-65
.79
.16
DPSS-R (12)
74
20.87
8.41
16-52
.86
.33
PSWQ (16)
74
56.34
12.87
18-68
.84
.20
BAT1 %
74
76.35
35.00
---Complete
BAT2 %
60
64.72
40.37
---Complete
BAT3 %
74
65.54
39.24
---Complete
Note. VOCI-CTM = Vancouver Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, contamination
subscale; OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, Revised; CES-D = Center
for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and
Sensitivity Scale, Revised; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; PANAS NA
= Negative Affect scale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PANAS PA
= Positive Affect scale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; % Complete
= percentage of steps completed during each BAT; AIC =Average inter-item
correlation.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistency by Condition
Scale (# of items)

M

SD

Range
Alpha AIC
M
SD
Range Alpha AIC
IMP (n = 42)
ICC (n = 32)
VOCI-CTM (12)
22.52 6.41
14-35 .71
.17
21.86 6.34
14-36 .62
.12
OCI-R (18)
21.19 11.85 0-41
.86
.26
23.66 12.08 0-49
.85
.25
CESD (20)
41.59 7.57
30-59 .76
.14
40.75 8.94
20-65 .82
.20
DPSS-R (12)
31.47 8.01
17-52 .87
.36
31.22 8.99
16-47 .85
.30
PSWQ (16)
47.11 10.12 29-68 .81
.18
48.13 10.84 18-63 .87
.26
BAT1 % Complete 77.78 35.05 ---74.45 35.41
--BAT2 % Complete 59.09 40.84 ---71.60 39.44
--BAT3 % Complete 60.71 40.29 ---71.87 37.49
--Note. IMP (n = 42), ICC (n = 32) – with exception of BAT2. For BAT2 IMP (n = 33), ICC (n = 27);
VOCI-CTM = Vancouver Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, contamination subscale; OCI-R =
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, Revised; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression
Scale; DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale, Revised; PSWQ = Penn State Worry
Questionnaire; AIC =Average inter-item correlation.
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distribution. However, given the analogue sample, it is unsurprising that participants typically
did not score near the top-end of the scale on most questionnaires. For example, the OCI-R has a
possible range from 0 to 72; the current sample reported scores ranging from 0 to 49, which is
similar to other published student samples (e.g., Hajcak, Huppert, Simons, & Foa, 2004). Again,
a notable exception is the VOCI contamination mean, which was elevated due to the current
study’s screening criteria (mean = 22.5 in the current sample compared to mean = 7.3 in a
previous student sample; Thordarson et al., 2004), and the range of scores, which are restricted
given the recruited sample. That is, in order to participate in the study, participants were
required to display an elevation on the VOCI, however those with a current diagnosis of OCD
(and therefore some of the highest VOCI scores) were excluded. Given this specific sample, the
range of the VOCI contamination score was restricted. Table 4 presents the zero-order
correlations between the baseline measures.

Table 4. Zero-Order Correlations between Baseline Measures
Variable
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1.
VOCI-CTM
2.
OCI-R
.32^
3.
CESD
.17
.42+
4.
DPSS-R
.34^ .33^ .30^
5.
PSWQ
.15
.42+ .35^
.37^
6.
BAT1 % Complete
-.06 .20
.18
.19
-.02
7.
BAT2 % Complete
-.28* .03
.14
-.07 -.13 .67+
8.
BAT3 % Complete
-.06 .31^ .21
.19
.01
.71+
.78+
9.
Pre Threat Endorse.
.17
.15
.10
.16
.08
.17
-.01 .09
10. Pre Benign Endorse. -.02 .05
.08
-.06
.01
.01
-.01 .01
.38^
*p < .05; ^p < .01; +p<.001
Note. VOCI-CTM = Vancouver Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, contamination subscale;
OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, Revised; DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and
Sensitivity Scale, Revised; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale;
PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire
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Preliminary Comparisons. To examine for potential baseline group differences, oneway ANOVAs were run with condition as the independent variable and each baseline variable
(VOCI contamination, OCI-R, DPSS-R, CES-D, PSWQ, sex, and current treatment status) as the
respective dependent variable. These analyses determined that scores on all measures were
similar across groups (see Table 5); therefore, none of these variables was included as a covariate
in the primary analyses.

Table 5. Group Comparisons of Baseline Variables
Variable
F
df
p
VOCI-CTM
0.19
1
.67
OCI-R
0.77
1
.38
DPSS-R
0.02
1
.90
CES-D
0.19
1
.66
PSWQ
0.17
1
.68
Sex
3.41
1
.07
Current Tx Status
0.81
1
.37
Threat Relatedness
0.07
73
.80
Benign Relatedness
0.59
73
.44
Pre-Bias Scores
0.54
73
.46
Note. VOCI-CTM = Vancouver Obsessive-Compulsive
Inventory, contamination subscale; OCI-R = ObsessiveCompulsive Inventory, Revised; DPSS-R = Disgust
Propensity and Sensitivity Scale, Revised; CES-D = Center
for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; PSWQ = Penn
State Worry Questionnaire; Tx = treatment.

Additional one-way ANOVAs were completed to assess for potential baseline differences
on the WSAP pre-assessment. Again, condition was used as the independent variable; baseline
threat-relatedness (i.e., how related participants indicated OC words were to ambiguous
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sentences), benign-relatedness (i.e., how related participants indicated benign words were to
ambiguous sentences), and bias scores were used as the dependent variables. Prior to conducting
the ANOVAs, pre-bias scores were computed by subtracting threat-relatedness scores from
benign-relatedness scores. A high benign-relatedness and low threat-relatedness score indicates
that a participant is displaying lower levels of dysfunctional beliefs; therefore, a high bias score
is preferred. These analyses confirmed that there were no significant differences across groups
on these variables. Specifically, the first ANOVA showed no significant group differences on
baseline threat-relatedness scores (F(1, 73) = 0.07, p = .80) and the second ANOVA showed no
significant group differences on baseline benign-relatedness scores (F(1, 73) = .59, p = .44).
Finally, no significant group differences were found on pre-assessment bias scores (F(1, 73) =
0.54, p = .46).

Primary Data Analyses

Two 2 (Group: IMP v ICC) x 2 (Time: Pre v Post) ANOVAs were used to assess the four
components of the first hypothesis. The first ANOVA found a significant Group X Time
interaction, (F(1, 147) = 21.52, p < .001), indicating that the change in interpretation biases for
threat were different across condition (see Table 6 for mean values). Follow-up pairwise
comparisons using paired samples t-tests revealed that (a) participants in the IMP condition
showed a significant decrease in endorsement of threat interpretations from pre-to-post
assessment (t(41) = 8.36, p < .001), but (b) participants in the ICC condition did not show a
significant decrease (t(31) = 1.56, p = .13). This supports Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The second
ANOVA did not find a significant Group X Time interaction for benign endorsement scores
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Table 6. Threat and Benign Endorsement Scores by Condition

Pre Threat Endorsement
Pre Benign Endorsement
Post Threat Endorsement
Post Benign Endorsement

IMP
M
.73
.69
.45
.71

SD
.13
.13
.21
.12

Range
.45 - .93
.33 - .93
.10 - .85
.40 - .95

ICC
M
.74
.74
.71
.76

SD
.15
.09
.14
.10

Range
.30 - .93
.58 - .88
.40 - .98
.48 - .98

(F(1, 147) = .01, p = .94). This finding indicates that interpretation biases for benign cues were not
different across conditions. This finding does not support Hypothesis 1c, that participants in the
IMP condition would display a significant increase in benign relatedness scores. Conversely,
Hypothesis 1d, that participants in the ICC condition would not display an increase in benign
relatedness, was supported.
Fourteen participants did not attempt BAT2 due to reported allergies. Because of the
difference in sample size (i.e., power) and potential self-selection bias, BAT2 (n = 60) was
analyzed separately from BAT1 and BAT3 (ns = 74). To examine Hypothesis 2, a 2 (Group:
IMP v ICC) x 2 (BAT type: BAT1, BAT3) MANOVA with repeated measurement on the second
factor was conducted. MANOVA results did not yield a significant main effect for condition
(F(1, 73) = 0.24, p = .63), however, the main effect of BAT type was significant (F(1, 73) = 9.14, p =
.003), as was the Group X BAT type interaction (F(1, 73) = 4.94, p = .03). Further exploration of
the interaction with Discriminant Analysis indicated that although the omnibus F tests for the
interaction was statistically significant, pairwise group compairsions examining differences
between groups for each of the BATs was not(BAT1: F(1, 73) = 1.48, p = .23; BAT3: F(2, 72) =
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2.43, p = .09). These results indicate that participants performed similarly on the BATs
regardless of condition, however, as a whole, participants performed differently on BAT1 (i.e.,
the laundry BAT) than they did on BAT3 (i.e., the toilet BAT). On average, participants
completed 76.4% of steps of BAT1, and only 65.6% of steps on BAT3. This difference was
statistically significant (t(73) = 3.27, p = .002). Regarding BAT2, a one-way ANOVA was
completed. Results (F(1, 48) = 1.54, p = .22) indicated that those in the IMP condition (n = 33)
performed similarly to those in the ICC condition (n = 27). When comparing the amount of
steps completed on BAT2 to the other BATs, results indicated that, on average, participants
completed 64.7% of steps on BAT2, which represented significantly fewer completed steps than
for BAT1 (t(59) = 2.41, p = .019), but not significantly more or fewer completed steps than for
BAT3 (t(59) = -0.08, p = .936).
Hypothesis 3 was tested using a series of independent samples t-tests. The first examined
for potential group-level differences for total anxiety and disgust scores for each of the three
BATs. Results indicated that participants in the IMP condition and participants in the ICC
condition reported similar levels of anxiety and disgust, collapsed across steps during BAT1
(anxiety: t(73) = 0.33, p = .75; disgust: t(73) = 0.28, p = .78), BAT2 (anxiety: t(59) = 1.58, p = .12;
t(59) = 1.69, p = .09), and BAT3 (anxiety: t(73) = -0.62, p = .54; disgust: t(73) = -0.60, p = .55).
Further analyses were completed to examine anxiety and disgust scores for the first step of each
of the three BATs, because all participants reported scores for these steps. Results indicated that
participants in both groups reported similar levels of anxiety and disgust on the first step of
BAT1 (anxiety: t(73) = 0.48, p = .64; disgust: t(73) = 0.29, p = .77), BAT2 (anxiety: t(59) = 0.96, p =
.34; disgust: t(59) = 0.99, p = .32), and BAT3 (anxiety: t(73) = -0.90, p = .37; disgust: t(73) = -0.81,
p = .42). These results do not yield support for Hypotheses 3a or 3b.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

The goals of the current study were driven by an interest in extending findings related to
dysfunctional interpretation from the social anxiety and OCD literatures. This study sought to
examine the relative effectiveness of a computerized interpretation modification paradigm, as
well as the effect of modification on participants’ willingness to approach a feared situation
within a behavioral approach task. Limited extant research suggests that interpretation
modification in individuals with OC concerns can be successful.
The first aim of the current study was to examine the ability to modify dysfunctional and
benign interpretations using word-sentence association, within an experimental design. The
current results corroborate extant findings in that they suggest interpretation modification is
possible in individuals with contamination concerns. Specifically, completion of the active
paradigm appeared to reduce levels of dysfunctional interpretations, but completion of the
control paradigm did not (Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported). These results are similar to
those in the published social anxiety and OCD literatures (e.g., Amir et al., 2010; Williams &
Grisham, 2013); however, they also extend the OCD literature. Specifically, the current study
modified an existing computerized assessment to successfully measure dysfunctional
interpretations in a sample of individuals with elevate OC concerns. Further, the current study
introduced stimuli (i.e., ambiguous scenarios and threatening words) that were used to
successfully modify threatening dysfunctional interpretations.
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Conversely, current results did not corroborate the finding that dysfunctional
interpretations may also be represented as a failure to make a benign interpretation of an
ambiguous event (Amir et al., 2012). Specifically, Hypothesis 1c was not supported, because the
active interpretation modification did not significantly increase participants’ benign
interpretations. Note that an increase of benign interpretations in the expected direction was
identified, however, the difference was not statistically significant. Current participants
displayed elevated levels of benign interpretations prior to taking part in the manipulation. That
is, participants indicated that benign words were related to the ambiguous sentences during the
pre-assessment task, prior to completing the training. The elevation of relatedness scores prior to
manipulation could have contributed to the lack of a significant change from pre- to postassessment (e.g., a ceiling effect). Additionally, the benign stimuli used could have been viewed
as highly related to the presented ambiguous scenarios (more so than the threatening stimuli). A
high level of relatedness could result in inflated benign interpretations, and therefore inflated
results, regardless of whether or not these interpretations were developed during training.
The second aim of the current study was to examine the effect of interpretation
modification on participants’ willingness to approach feared situations during a contaminationrelated BAT. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the current study did not find support for increased
willingness to approach feared situations for those who completed the active manipulation versus
those who completed the control manipulation. That is, participants in both the IMP and ICC
groups performed similarly across the three behavioral tasks. However, extant literature suggests
that behavioral change within a single session is difficult to obtain. Instead, change is more
likely to occur when individuals are given increased time and/or experience in modifying their
interpretations (Clearkin & Teachman, 2011). Therefore, the manipulation may have increased
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behavioral or emotional consequences if participants completed for a longer duration of time
(e.g., 30 minutes) or over multiple sessions (e.g., 3 to 5 sessions).
Additionally, all participants who participated in the study reported subclinical levels of
OC concerns. These subclinical levels of distress suggest that the present finding (i.e., no
difference between IMP and ICC with regard to behavioral approach) should be considered
preliminary until replicated in a clinical sample (e.g., replication with additional participants who
display clinical levels of OC concerns). Interestingly, participants performed differently on
BAT1 as compared to BAT2 and BAT3. That is, the mean scores for BAT1 were higher than for
those in the other BATs, in both the IMP and ICC groups. This finding suggests that the BATs
may provide a hierarchy of approach situations (e.g., dirty laundry was easier to approach than
the dirt mixture or dirty toilet) that could be appropriate for use with a clinical population.
Surprisingly, and contrary to Hypotheses 3a and 3b, the IMP and ICC conditions reported
similar levels of anxiety and disgust during completion of the BATs. Taken together with results
related to Hypothesis 2, these findings indicate that although completion of the active
modification condition (IMP) resulted in fewer dysfunctional interpretations, it did not appear to
have immediate behavioral or emotional consequences.
One possible explanation for this finding is that the dosage of the intervention was too
low. Participants only completed the active or control modification paradigm once, for
approximately 12 to 15 minutes. Whereas this dose of intervention may be sufficient for
participants in the active condition to learn new relationships between presented words and
ambiguous scenarios, it may not be enough time for the new associations to become automatized
or available when participants face feared scenarios. For example, participants could learn to not
associate the word “germs” with an ambiguous scenario related to shaking someone’s hand,
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however when faced with a similar scenario, the new relationship they formed may not be
available, allowing distress related to shaking a hand to emerge. A second possible explanation
for a lack of immediate behavioral and emotional consequences of interpretation modification is
inherent to the BAT methodology. Each of the three BATs includes six steps that are completed
in a hierarchical fashion, with the assumption that anxiety levels will increase as a function of the
number of steps completed by each participant (Najmi & Amir, 2010). However, due to ethical
considerations, participants were allowed to terminate the BATs at any point during the task,
which limits the informative nature of anxiety and disgust ratings as stand-alone measures.
Relatedly, it is possible that modification of dysfunctional interpretations do not impact
anxiety or disgust directly. Extant literature has suggested that completion of behavioral
measures assess specific aspects of behaviors that may be distinct from a broad range of thoughts
and feelings typically reported by participants on self-report measures (Edmonds, Bogg, &
Roberts, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that instead of acting on anxiety or disgust,
modifications are acting on a third variable less commonly reported by participants, such as
overall distress tolerance. That is, a reduction in dysfunctional interpretations could increase an
individual’s ability to tolerate anxiety and disgust they are experiencing instead of directly
impacting anxiety and disgust levels in the context of a feared situation. Distress tolerance was
not measured in the current study; however, in future studies it may be helpful to examine effects
of dysfunctional interpretation modification on this outcome variable.

55

Limitations and Future Directions

This study provided useful preliminary information regarding the ability to use
computerized assessment to modify dysfunctional interpretations in individuals with
contamination concerns, and the impact of interpretation modification on feared situations.
Nonetheless, this study had several limitations.
First, the use of an undergraduate sample with subclinical levels of OC concerns indicates
the current results should be considered preliminary until replicated in a clinical sample.
Replication with a clinical sample will provide a greater understanding of modification abilities
of dysfunctional interpretations that are causing clinical functional impairment. It is possible that
the subclinical levels of OC concerns reported by participants in the current study do not cause
significant behavioral avoidance or functional impairment. By using a clinical sample where
these difficulties are prevalent, full exploration of the relationship between dysfunctional
interpretation modification and behavioral avoidance is possible. Furthermore, with the current
sample we are unable to determine the potential therapeutic benefit of the computerized
assessments and trainings; a clinical sample must be used to assess potential benefits.
Moreover, whereas student samples are often used in research and have shown to be a
useful source of information regarding psychological symptoms, it is unlikely that students
participating in a research study (with the primary goal of obtaining class credit) would be as
motivated to provide maximum personal effort as participants with a clinical diagnosis. That is,
the results are likely limited by the level of commitment that each participant put forth during the
computerized assessment and behavioral tasks. As mentioned, participants were able to
discontinue the behavioral task at any point, and were not asked why they chose to do so. As
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such, there is no way to know whether they discontinued because of fear or some other reason. It
seems possible that participants with a diagnosis of OCD may have been more willing to
complete the behavioral tasks due to specific benefits related to their difficulties (e.g., potential
increase in distress tolerance or reduction in anxiety). Distress levels will likely be higher in a
clinical sample, which could make the individuals less likely to complete more BAT steps than a
student sample. However, if this outcome emerged, the discontinuation of BAT steps would
likely be a result of distress/fear and not motivation.
Second, a procedural decision that may have affected findings and generalizability to
individuals experiencing symptoms consistent with OCD dimensions other than contamination
was the restriction of the sample to individuals experiencing concerns similar to those associated
with OCD contamination. As noted, this decision was made for logistical reasons. Specifically,
restricting the sample to those with contamination concerns allowed study stimuli to be
applicable to a wider range of participants, and allowed for the use of a standardized behavioral
task with extant empirical support (e.g., Najmi et al., 2012). However, restricting the sample to
individuals with contamination concerns may make the results generalize more readily to
individuals with specific fears than those with OCD symptoms. In order to bolster
generalizability, further research is needed to assess interpretation modification ability in other
OCD symptom dimensions.
Third, the only measure of interpretation bias (i.e., level of dysfunctional beliefs)
included in this study was an assessment variant of the task used to also modify dysfunctional
beliefs. A novel set of stimuli was used for assessment and modification; however, it may be
beneficial to include an additional measure of interpretation bias (e.g., the WASO; Kuckertz et
al., 2013) or an assessment version of the Clerkin & Teachman (2011) word fragment paradigm.
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A secondary or different measure could assist with the examination of generalizability of
interpretation modification with the IMP across different measures (i.e., can interpretation
modifications learned with one measure be identified using a different form of assessment?).
Additionally, use of a different assessment task could reduce potential practice or fatigue effects
participants experienced by completing three versions of a similar task. A number of
participants were removed from analyses due to lack of response variability during the computer
tasks. When lack of variability was present, it most commonly occurred during the postassessment task. Although anecdotal, this evidence suggests that fatigue effects may be
influencing how participants are engaging with the task.
Relatedly, the lack of significant differences in anxiety and disgust ratings across
conditions may reflect a potential difficulty in measuring anxiety and/or disgust accurately. In
the current study, participants were asked to report their anxiety and disgust levels using a 0 (no
anxiety/disgust) to 100 (extreme anxiety/disgust) scale. The scale provided to participants may
not have clearly outlined what “extreme” anxiety and disgust looked like, therefore making it
difficult for participants to quantify their levels of these experiences. In future studies, it may be
helpful to clearly define multiple points on the scale to help participants better classify the level
of disgust/anxiety they are experiencing.
A final limitation of the current study is that a measure of participants’ levels of
behavioral avoidance was not collected prior to completing the intervention. Having a preintervention measure of avoidance would have allowed for an avoidance change score to be
calculated after the BATs were completed. A change score would have provided a more
comprehensive evaluation of interpretation modification effectiveness, perhaps leading to
significant differences between the IMP and ICC group on behavioral avoidance. For example,
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individuals in the ICC group could have had lower baseline levels of behavioral avoidance,
therefore making it easier for them to complete the BAT than those in the IMP condition. If a
change score measure were calculated, baseline levels would not be as influential on results.
However, a potential issue with such a procedure is that the extant literature does not recommend
repeating the three BATs within a short period of time (Najmi & Amir, 2010). Therefore, given
the brevity of the current intervention, it was not possible to use the same behavioral task at two
time points. Additionally, participants differentially responded to the stimuli presented in the
behavioral tasks, suggesting it is not appropriate to compare avoidance levels across tasks.
Limitations notwithstanding, the present study provides a foundation for future studies.
Future studies could examine effectiveness of interpretation in other OCD symptom dimensions
(e.g., checking) to determine if similar reductions in dysfunctional interpretations can be
achieved with a similar single-trial intervention. Future studies could employ a multi-session
design to determine if the effectiveness of modification of dysfunctional interpretations increases
with more exposure. Additionally, a multi-session study would lend itself more readily to prepost administration of a behavioral task, which was not possible in the current study. A multisession design would also allow participants an opportunity to measure behavioral avoidance
they are exhibiting outside of the experiment. As for measuring anxiety and disgust levels
during the behavioral experiment, future studies could include a scale with multiple descriptors,
perhaps one ideographically generated with each participant to ensure accurate ratings of anxiety
and disgust. Related, future studies may benefit from the inclusion of a general measure of
distress tolerance administered pre and post intervention to determine more general changes in
distress, instead of specific changes yoked to a behavioral paradigm. Last, future studies could
benefit from the use of a clinical sample
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Conclusions

Although further research is required to replicate the current findings, the present study
suggested that a computerized assessment of interpretation modification may be effective in
reducing dysfunctional interpretations in individuals with contamination concerns. This study
provided novel information regarding the use of computerized assessment measures,
computerized interpretation modification paradigms, and the behavioral effects of specific
dysfunctional interpretation modification. The present findings suggest that use of interpretation
paradigms is helpful in reducing levels of dysfunctional beliefs, but not enhancing benign
beliefs. Although further research with clinical samples and individuals with symptoms
associated with other targeted OCD symptoms is needed, these preliminary findings provide a
sound foundation for further assessment of interpretation modification as a possible treatment
modality for individuals with OC concerns.
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Appendix A
Permissions for Materials
1. Permission was granted to my advisor, Dr. Kevin Wu, and his research lab for the ObsessiveCompulsive Inventory – Revised.
2. Permission was sought from author and granted (for no cost) for the following measures:
(1) The Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI),
(2) The Disgust Scale – Revised (DS-R),
(3) The Word-Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP),
(4) The Interpretation Modification Paradigm (IMP),
(5) The Interpretation Control Condition (ICC), and
(6) The Behavioral Approach Task.
3. The following measures are posted online and available for use (at no cost) to all researchers:
(1) The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D); retrieved from
www.midss.org)
(2) The Penn State Worry Questionnaire; retrieved from www.midss.org),
(3) The Disgust Scale – Revised the (DS-R; retrieved from
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhaidt/disgustscale.html).
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Appendix B

Screening Measure: VOCI – CTM Subscale

VOCI- Contamination Subscale (VOCI-CTM) © Thordarson et al., 2010
Please rate each statement by putting a circle around the number that best describes how much the
statement is true of you. Please answer every item, without spending too much time on any particular
item.
How much is each of the following statements true of you?

1.

I feel very dirty after touching money.

2.

I use an excessive amount of disinfectants to keep my home or
myself safe from germs.

3.

I spend far too much time washing my hands.

4.

Touching the bottom of my shoes makes me very anxious.

5.

I find it very difficult to touch garbage or garbage bins.

6.

I am excessively concerned about germs and disease.

7.

I avoid using public telephones because of possible
contamination.

Not at
all

A
little

Some

Much

Very
much

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

8.

I feel very contaminated if I touch an animal.

9.

I am very afraid of having even slight contact with bodily
secretions (blood, urine, sweat, etc.).

0

1

2

3

4

10. One of my major problems is that I am excessively concerned
about cleanliness.

0

1

2

3

4

11. I often experience upsetting and unwanted thoughts about
illness.

0

1

2

3

4

12. I am afraid to use even well-kept public toilets because I am so
concerned about germs.

0

1

2

3

4
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Appendix C
Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP) – Interpretation Bias Assessment
© Dr. Nader Amir

+

Each trial starts with a
fixation cross in the
center of the screen for
500ms.

Was the word related to
the sentence?

Participants are then asked if
the word was related to the
sentence. They press “1” to
indicate the word and
sentence that were presented
are related, and “3” to
indicate they are not related.

contaminated

The cross will disappear,
and then a word (threatening
or benign) will appear and
remain on the screen for
500ms.

+

After the participant presses
“1” or “3”, the next trial
begins with a fixation cross.

I use shopping carts at
the store.

The word will disappear and
a sentence will appear. The
sentence will remain on the
screen until the participant
presses the space bar.
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Appendix D
Interpretation Modification Paradigm (IMP) – Active Modification Condition
© Dr. Nader Amir

“Threatening” Trial Example.

+

Each trial starts with a
fixation cross in the center
of the screen for 500ms.

germs

I picked up something
someone has dropped

The cross will disappear, and
then a word (threatening or
benign) will appear and remain
on the screen for 500ms.

The word will disappear and a
sentence will appear. The
sentence will remain on the
screen until the participant
presses the space bar.

Was the word related to the
sentence?

Was the word related to the
sentence?

If the participant pressed
“1” to indicate the word
and sentence were related,
they would receive
negative feedback
indicating that their answer
was incorrect.

If the participant pressed
“3” to indicate the word
and sentence were not
related, they would receive
positive feedback
indicating that their answer
was correct.

Was the word related to the
sentence?

Participants are then asked
if the word was related to
the sentence. They press
“1” to indicate the word
and sentence that were
presented are related, and
“3” to indicate they are not
related.
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“Benign” Trial Example.

+

Each trial starts with a
fixation cross in the center
of the screen for 500ms.

helpful

I picked up something
someone has dropped

The cross will disappear, and
then a word (threatening or
benign) will appear and
remain on the screen for
500ms.

The word will disappear and a
sentence will appear. The
sentence will remain on the
screen until the participant
presses the space bar.

Was the word related to the
sentence?

Was the word related to the
sentence?

If the participant pressed
“3” to indicate the word
and sentence were not
related, they would
receive negative feedback
indicating that their
answer was incorrect.

If the participant pressed
“1” to indicate the word
and sentence were related,
they would receive
positive feedback
indicating that their
answer was correct.

Was the word related to the
sentence?

Participants are then asked
if the word was related to
the sentence. They press
“1” to indicate the word
and sentence that were
presented are related, and
“3” to indicate they are
not related.
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Appendix E
Interpretation Control Condition (ICC) – Control Modification Condition
© Dr. Nader Amir

Please refer to the images for the IMP condition. The ICC is identical to the IMP condition with
the exception of feedback contingency being reduced to 50%.

